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These studies explore children’s conceptual knowledge as it is expressed through 
their verbal and gestural explanations of concepts. We build on previous work 
that has shown that children who produce a large proportion of gestures that do 
not match their verbal explanations are in transition with respect to the concept 
they are explaining. This gesture/speech mismatch has been called “discor- 
dance.” Previous work discovered this phenomenon with respect to 5- to 7-year- 
old children’s explanations of conservation problems. Study 1 shows: (I) that 
older children (IO to 11 years old) exhibit gesture/speech discordance with respect 
to another concept, understanding the equivalence relationship in mathematical 
equations, and; (2) that children who produce many discordant responses in their 
explanations of mathematical equivalence are more likely to benefit from instruc- 
tion in the concept than are children who produce few such responses. Studies 2 
and 3 explore the properties and usefulness of discordance as an index of transi- 
tional knowledge in a child’s acquisition of mathematical equivalence. Under any 
circumstance in which new concepts are acquired, there exists a mental bridge 
connecting the old knowledge state to the new. The studies reported here suggest 
that the combination of gesture and speech may be an easily observable and 
significantly interpretable reflection of knowledge states, both static and in flux. 
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One of the most elusive concepts to validate in the study of learning is the 
transitional knowledge state. Work by Piaget (e.g., 1967) and others (e.g., 
Siegler, 1979) has described the progressive levels children pass through while 
acquiring concepts, but relatively little work has addressed how children actually 
make the transition from one level of understanding to the next (see Keil, 1984; 
Kessen, 1962, 1984; Stemberg, 1984). The purpose of the present investigation 
is to identify children who are in a transitional state between levels of conceptual 
understanding and to explore the differences between transitional and stable 
knowledge states. 
The Transitional Knowledge State 
The notion of receptivity to environmental input has often been associated with 
transitional knowledge states: the hypothesis being that a child in a transitional 
knowledge state is one who has not yet displayed consistent knowledge of a 
concept but whose underlying cognitive structures are sufficiently developed to 
allow him to accommodate new information in that concept (cf. Beilin, 1965; 
Brainerd, 1972; Langer & Strauss, 1972; Murray, 1974; Strauss & Langer, 1970; 
Strauss & Rimalt, 1974). Although the notion of a transitional knowledge state is 
intuitively appealing, it has proved very difficult to operationalize. 
The transitional knowledge state has frequently been defined operationally as 
one that can be influenced by instruction (e.g., Strauss, 1972; Vygotsky, 1962). 
Using this definition, pinpointing the transitional state is easy in retrospect since 
any group of children can be exposed to instruction and the subset who benefit 
from the instruction will have been, by definition, in “transition.” Although this 
post hoc definition itself lacks predictive value, it can serve as the standard 
against which other prospective characterizations of the transitional knowledge 
state are evaluated. In other words, any proposed marker of transitional knowl- 
edge ought to be able to divide children into those who are more and less ready to 
progress to a new level of understanding of a concept. 
One variable proposed to identify the transitional knowledge state, and one 
that could be used predictively, is the coexistence of unintegrated levels of 
understanding (Beilin, 1965; Piaget, 1967; Strauss, 1972). Children who exhibit 
unintegrated levels of understanding of a concept by this hypothesis would be 
“transitional,” tl’# is, mQre likely to progress to a new level of understanding of 
that concept than children who do not exhibit unintegrated levels of understand- 
ing. However, determining whether or not a child has unintegrated knowledge 
has itself proved to be quite difficult (Kessen, 1984). 
One technique for detecting whether a child has unintegrated levels of under- 
standing with respect to a concept is to probe the consistency of the child’s 
problem-solving behaviors on tasks instantiating that concept. A child who 
sometimes performs correctly and sometimes incorrectly on the same problem or 
across a set of similar problems might be thought to have knowledge of the 
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correct solution that co-exists with, and is not integrated with. his incorrect 
knowledge (Wilkinson, 1982). For example, researchers have characterized chil- 
dren who conserve on some conservation tasks but not on others as having a 
(correct) understanding of conservation that co-exists with their (incorrect) be- 
liefs in nonconservation (Strauss, 1972). 
It will, of course, come as no surprise if it turns out that a child who is correct 
on a problem some (but not all) of the time is more likely to progress to a new 
level of understanding (i.e., is more likely to be transitional) than a child who is 
never correct on that problem. In addition to being somewhat obvious, charac- 
terizing the transitional knowledge state as one in which a child is sometimes 
correct and sometimes incorrect also appears to be overly narrow. After all, a 
child who produces no correct responses at all. although not as advanced as a 
child who is correct some of the time, might still be in a transitional knowledge 
state, ready to progress to a partially correct state. For example, Gelman (1969) 
instructed a group of 5-year-olds, all of whom failed an entire set of Piagetian 
conservation tasks, and found that some of the children benefitted from instruc- 
tion to focus on the relevant dimensions of the conservation problems, while 
others did not. The children who benefitted from training could retrospectively 
be defined as transitional; yet there was no apparent way of determining a priori 
who would benefit from training, since all of the children were incorrect on all of 
the problems in the pretest. 
A second technique commonly used to identify children in transition is to 
consider a child transitional if he has knowledge of the component parts of a 
concept but has not yet integrated those components and therefore has not yet 
mastered the entire concept. This technique is basic to the notion of learning 
“readiness.” For example, children who possess all of the component skills 
necessary to read are said to be “reading ready” and have been shown to read 
earlier than children who do not possess these component skills (Wagner & 
Torgesen, 1987). As a second example, Siegler (1976) showed that, although 5- 
and g-year-old children both failed to predict whether a balance scale would tip 
to the right, tip to the left, or remain centered when released, the g-year-old 
children possessed the components necessary to progress to the next level of 
understanding of the balance scale while the 5-year-old children did not; in 
particular, in a separate encoding task, the g-year-old children were able to 
encode both the weight and distance on the balance scale while the 5-year-old 
children encoded only weight. Thus, the g-year-old children appeared to be 
“ready” to learn about the balance scale and, indeed, Siegler (1976) found that 
the g-year-old children were able to benefit from instruction on the balance scale 
while the 5-year-old children were not. 
The difficulty with predicting transitional status on the basis of “readiness” is 
that one needs to understand all of the components relevant to a task in order to 
be able to tap knowledge of those components in a child. Since a separate 
“readiness” test must be devised for each individual component of each con- 
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cept, there can be no hope of a general “readiness” marker of transitional 
knowledge that could be used across a range of concepts. 
The Relationship Between Gesture and Speech as an Index of 
Transitional Knowledge 
Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986), in a series of studies in which children were 
tested in the Piagetian concept of conservation, reported a technique that identi- 
fied children who were in a transitional state with respect to their understanding 
of conservation. Moreover, this technique, at least in principle, can be used to 
identify children who are transitional with respect to a wide range of concepts. 
The technique focuses not only on the information contained in children’s verbal 
explanations of problem solutions (which have traditionally been taken to reflect, 
at least in part, the knowledge individuals use to solve problems, cf. Brainerd, 
1973; Siegler, 1981), but also on an untapped behavior resource that frequently 
and predictably accompanies spoken explanations-gesture. McNeil1 (1985, 
1986; McNeil1 & Levy, 1982) suggests that gesture, a separate channel of com- 
munication, allows an observer to view additional aspects of mental representa- 
tion that are not captured in speech. 
Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986) found that, when 5- to 8-year-old chil- 
dren were asked to explain their solutions to a set of conservation problems, the 
children gestured along with their spoken explanations. Moreover, the gestures 
produced by the children, like their speech, conveyed information about the 
conservation task; specifically, about the attributes of the objects used in the 
conservation tasks, and about the actions performed on those objects. For exam- 
ple, when asked to explain his solution to a liquid quantity conservation problem, 
one child focused on the height of the water in both speech (“there is less water 
in the dish because the dish is short and the glass is tall”) and in gesture (a flat 
hand with the palm facing down first demarcates the height of the dish and then 
moves to demarcate the height of the glass). 
In addition, Church and Goldin-Meadow examined the relationship between 
gesture and speech within each explanation. They found that, for a subset of 
children, gestures tended to convey information different from that conveyed in 
the accompanying speech. Church and Goldin-Meadow defined two new terms: 
“discordance,” which signifies that the child had produced many explanations 
in which gesture fails to match speech, and “concordance,” which signifies that 
the child had produced few such mismatches. They further hypothesized that 
discordance was an operational index of the transitional knowledge state, and 
that discordant children would progress to the next level of conservation under- 
standing before concordant children would. 
In order to validate gesture/speech discordance as an index of transitional 
knowledge, Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986) exposed a group of partial con- 
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servers (i.e.. children who gave correct judgments on some but not all of a set of 
six conservation tasks) to instruction in conservation and evaluated their perfor- 
mance on a posttest. They found that those children who were discordant on the 
pretest (i.e., produced a large proportion of gesture/speech mismatches) were 
more likely to benefit from training than the children who were concordant on the 
pretest (i.e., produced few such mismatches). This observation held true even 
though both groups of partial conservers (the discordant partial conservers and 
the concordant partial conservers) displayed the same level of understanding of 
conservation on the pretest, as assessed by number of correct judgments and 
quality of verbal explanations. Thus. gesture/speech discordance was validated 
as a means of identifying children who are in a transitional knowledge state, at 
least with respect to conservation. 
One limitation of the Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986) study is that it 
focused on transition with respect to only one concept-conservation. The present 
series of studies will attempt to detemline whether discordance can serve as a more 
general index of transitional knowledge by exploring gesture/speech discordance 
in a second concept. mathematical equivalence (understanding that quantities on 
both sides of a mathematical equation are equivalent). Study I is designed to 
investigate two questions: First, does gesture/speech discordance exist in a con- 
cept other than conservation’? We will probe children’s understanding of mathe- 
matical equivalence. and determine whether children can be identified as either 
concordant or discordant with respect to this concept. Second, does discordance 
predict transition with respect to the child’s understanding of mathematical equiv- 
alence? We will determine whether children who produce discordant responses are 
more likely to benefit from instruction in mathematical equivalence than are 
children who produce concordant responses. As in our conservation study, we 
control for absolute level of understanding, in this case. as assessed by the number 
of correct solutions on a preinstruction addition test. In this way, we hope to 
validate discordance as an index of transitional knowledge with respect to a second 
concept. 
The remaining two studies are designed to probe discordance itself, exploring 
its properties in an attempt to understand this measure better as an index of 
transitional knowledge. Study 2 explores whether a child can be discordant with 
respect to one concept (a concept he is likely to be in the process of mastering) 
but concordant with respect to a second concept (a concept he is likely to have 
already mastered). In other words. we explore whether discordance varies within 
the individual child according to his understanding of the concept being ex- 
plained. 
The discordant child, by definition. says one thing while gesturing another 
and thus is inconsistent across the modalities he uses to express his beliefs about 
a concept. Study 3 investigates whether discordant children are inconsistent even 
when only one modality-the verbal modality-is considered, and whether this 
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verbal inconsistency is responsible for the discordant child’s heightened recep- 
tivity to instruction. 
STUDY 1 
Study I extends previous observations of gesture/speech discordance in conser- 
vation to a new concept. mathematical equivalence. The initial goal of Study I 
was to examine whether gesture/speech discordance exists in children’s explana- 
tions of this second concept. To meet this goal, we first determined whether 
children, asked to explain their solutions to a series of addition problems, would 
produce gestures along with their spoken explanations. We then determined 
whether the children who gestured would produce explanations in which the 
information conveyed in gesture failed to match the information conveyed in 
speech; that is. we detemlined whether any of the children could be considered 
“discordant” with respect to mathematical equivalence. The second goal of 
Study I was to examine whether gesture/speech discordance could be used to 
index transitional knowledge with respect to mathematical equivalence. To meet 
this goal, we exposed the children, later classified as either “discordant” or 
“concordant” on the basis of their explanations on the original addition test. to 
training on the addition problems. and evaluated their performance on a posttest 
and generalization test. Our hypothesis was that children who were discordant on 
the pretest would be more likely to benefit from the instruction than children who 
were concordant. 
METHOD 
Choosing the Task 
We have chosen to explore gesture/speech discordance with respect to the con- 
cept of mathematical equivalence, that is. understanding that one side of an 
equation represents the same quantity as the other side of the equation. We have 
selected problems that reflect the principle of associativity over addition to 
instantiate one notion of mathematical equivalence. The associative principle of 
addition allows numbers to be grouped on one side of an equation without 
changing the equality relationship between the two sides of the equation. For 
example, ‘4 + 6 + 9 = 10 + 9’ makes use of the associative principle since the 
4 and the 6 from the left side of the equation can be grouped and summed to 
produce the IO on the right side of the equation. 
We have chosen the concept of mathematical equivalence to extend our work 
on discordance because the concept is parallel to conservation in certain respects, 
yet remains sufficiently distinct to pemlit inferences of the generality of the 
discordance measure as an index of transitional knowledge. The tasks used to 
assess the concepts of conservation and mathematical equivalence are similar in 
that quantities are presented that appear different yet actually are equivalent. For 
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example, six checkers in a line have the same quantity as six checkers in a circle 
(from a conservation task) and 4 + 6 + 9 has the same quantity as 10 + 9 (from a 
mathematical equivalence task). The two concepts differ, however, in several 
respects: age of acquisition (conservation is typically acquired around ages 5 to 
8, mathematical equivalence around 9 to 12), level of abstraction (conservation 
is a concrete operational task, mathematical equivalence is a task involving 
manipulation of symbols), and dependence upon input (conservation is typically 
acquired without benefit of instruction, while mathematical equivalence will be 
acquired only after some instruction in the symbol system of formal mathemat- 
ics, cf., Feldman, 1980; Vygotsky, 1962). 
We studied children’s solutions to problems of the form ‘a + b + c = - + 
c’ because these problems have been found to provide a valid indication of 
children’s knowledge of the equal sign (Perry, 1985). Children ages 9 to 12 are 
capable of solving simple addition problems of the form ‘a + b + c = -’ and 
thus appear to understand the equal sign. However, these children may be getting 
the correct answer to these simple problems for the wrong reasons; for example, 
a child may interpret the equal sign as an instruction to add all of the numbers on 
the left side of the equation (and not as an instruction to make both sides of the 
equation equal, cf. Behr, Erlwanger, & Nichols, 1980; Ginsburg, 1977; Kieran, 
1980). Indeed, in a study of 227 fourth- and fifth-grade children, Perry (1985) 
found that 88% of the children-all of whom could perform well on simple 
addition problems-failed to solve more complex problems like ‘4 + 6 + 9 = 
- + 9’, thus appearing to have, at best, an incomplete understanding of the 
equal sign. 
A second reason for choosing this particular form of addition problems was 
that most children in the targeted age range typically possess the skills that are 
logically prerequisite to solving problems of this type (i.e., they can add, sub- 
tract, group, etc.). Moreover, these problems are not included in most first- 
through fourth-grade math curricula (Freeman, Kuhs, Porter, Floden, Schmidt, 
& Schwille, 1983; Perry, 1988). Thus, it was likely that the children had not 
received formal instruction in problems of this type. 
The six mathematical equivalence problems that were used in this study are 
presented in Table 1. As can be seen from the table, each of the numbers in the 
six problems is less than 10; this precaution was taken in order to reduce errors 
Table I. The 6 Addition Problems 
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caused by faulty addition algorithms (e.g., “bugs” in carrying, see Brown & 
Burton, 1978, which appear more frequently when children work with large 
numbers). 
Subjects 
Forty children from the fourth and fifth grades in five schools in the Chicago area 
participated in the paper-and-pencil addition test. Children who were successful 
on all or some of the six problems on the test were eliminated from the study 
(only 3 children in this sample). The remaining 37 children who gave incorrect 
solutions on all six problems comprised the subjects for the study. Our decision 
to include only those children who were incorrect on all six pretest problems 
stems from the desire to explore transitional knowledge in a group of children 
who did not explicitly show partial knowledge of the concept. 
Procedure 
Each child was tested individually and participated in a series of four consecutive 
videotaped sessions conducted on the same day. The sessions included pretest, 
training, posttest, and generalization sessions. 
(1) During the pretest, each child was administered a paper-and-pencil test 
containing six addition problems (see Table 1). The children were told to do 
their best on the problems and not to worry if some of the problems were 
difficult. No time limit on the test was imposed but the test took no longer 
than 5 minutes for any of the children (mean time for completion = 2 
minutes, 9 seconds, SD = 53 seconds). At the completion of the paper-and- 
pencil test, each child was asked to explain how he or she arrived at his 
answers. The experimenter wrote the first addition problem of the test on 
the blackboard, including the child’s answer to the problem, and asked, 
“Can you tell me how you figured out that answer?” After the child 
responded, the experimenter wrote the second problem on the blackboard 
and repeated the question. The experimenter continued until the child had 
explained the solutions to all six problems. 
(2) During training, the child was exposed to instruction in the principle under- 
lying the addition problems. We selected this type of instruction because 
principle-based (or goal-based) instruction has been shown to be particu- 
larly effective in extending and deepening a child’s understanding of a 
concept (e.g., Baroody & Ginsburg, 1986; Mayer & Greeno, 1972).’ An 
I It is quite likely that the nature of the instructional input a discordant child receives affects 
whether the child will improve after training. Indeed, we have found that procedural training is not 
effective in promoting understanding of a concept in either discordant or concordant children (Perry, 
Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988; Perry, 1988). 
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experimenter who was not at the pretest. and therefore was blind to the 
child’s status as concordant or discordant, wrote on the blackboard an 
addition problem of the sort that was on the original paper-and-pencil test. 
The experimenter then told the child that the goal of the problem was to 
make both sides of the equation equal. No instruction was given in any 
procedures for achieving this goal and no solutions were provided. The 
experimenter then wrote a second problem on the blackboard and asked the 
child to attempt this problem on his or her own. The experimenter gave no 
feedback to the child (other than general encouragement) but would repeat 
the instructional phrases if the child requested assistance. The experimenter 
repeated this sequence with two additional problems of the same type. 
(3) During the posttest. each child was given a paper-and-pencil test that con- 
tained six addition problems comparable to those on the pretest. 
(4) During the generalization test, each child was asked to solve two addition 
problems in a new form ‘a + b + c = d + -’ (e.g., 7 + 2 + 9 = 8 
+ -), two problems instantiating a new operation, multiplication ‘a X b 
Xc=aX -’ (e.g., 2 X 4 X 3 = 2 X - , ) and a series of three 
interview questions designed to determine which solutions the child would 
consider acceptable answers to a particular problem (e.g., “If you were the 
teacher and a student put a I3 in the blank for the problem 4 + 6 + 3 = - 
+ 3, would you tell the student that his answer was correct or incorrect’? 
Why? How about if the student put 4 + 6 in the blank’?” etc.). 
Coding the Addition Problems on the Pretest 
The number of problems the children solved correctly on the paper-and-pencil 
test was recorded. Because we were interested in children who had not yet 
acquired mathematical equivalence, we eliminated from the study children who 
answered any of the six problems on the test correctly (3 children were elimi- 
nated, as described above). 
Coding Explanations on the Pretest 
Coding Speech Alone. We considered all of the responses that followed the 
experimenter’s request for an explanation, gestured as well as spoken, to com- 
prise a child’s explanation. Coding was accomplished in three stages: (1) speech 
alone, (2) gesture alone, and (3) the relationship between speech and gesture. 
Each explanation was coded first for speech alone. With the picture turned off, 
one coder listened only to the audio portion of the tapes and coded the informa- 
tion conveyed in the children’s speech independently of gesture. The children 
produced six different types of strategies in their spoken explanations; three 
equivalence explanations (describing strategies in which the sum on the right side 
of the equation was equal to the sum on the left side) and three nonequivalence 
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explanations (describing strategies in which the sum on the right side of the 
equation was different from the sum on the left side; see Table 2). 
The three equivalence explanations were: 
Explanations indicating that the two numbers on the left side of the equation, 
which do not also appear on the right side of the’ equation, have been 
grouped and summed (i.e., the grouping strategy, see Example 1 in Table 
2). 
Explanations indicating that all of the numbers on the left side of the equa- 
tion have been summed and the number that appears on both sides of the 
equation has been subtracted from this sum (i.e., the add-subtract strategy, 
see Example 2 in Table 2). 
Explanations indicating that the numbers on the right side of the equation 
must sum to the same total as the numbers on the left side of the equation 
(i.e., the equalize strategy, see Example 3 in Table 2). 
Table 2. Examples of Types of Strategies Expressed in Verbal Explanations 
and the Matching Gesture Accompanying those Explanations 
Problem: 4 + 6 -I- 9 = - -I- 9 
Type of Verbal 
Explanation Speech Matching Gesture 
Equivalence Explanations 
Grouping “The 9 was there so I added 
the 4 and 6” 
Adding-Subtracting “I added 4 plus 6 plus 9 and 
that equals 19; to make both 
sides equal, I had to subtract 
the 9 so the answer is 19” 
Equalize “4 plus 6 plus 9 equals 19, so 
to make the other side equal 
19, you need 10 more” 
Nonequivalence Explanations 
Add-All “I added 4 plus 6 plus 9 plus 9 
equal 28” 
Add-to-Equal Sign “I added 4 plus 6 plus 9 equals 
19” 
CW “They don’t have another 4 like 
that so I put the 4 over there” 
Hand grabs below the 4 and 6. pause, 
point at blank 
Point at 4. point at 6, point at 9 on the 
left side of the equation, pause, 
hand pulls down under the 9 on the 
right side of the equation, point at 
blank 
Sweep across the 4, 6, and 9 on the 
left side of the equation, point at the 
equal sign, sweep across the blank 
and 9 on the right side of the equa- 
tion 
Point at 4, point at 6, point at left 9, 
point at right 9, point at blank 
Point at 4. point at first addition sign 
from left, point at 6, point at second 
addition sign from left. point at left 
9, point at blank 
Point at the 4 on the left side of the equa- 
tion, point at blank 
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The three nonequivalence explanations were: 
4. Explanations indicating that all of the numbers in the problem have been 
summed (i.e., the add-all strategy, see Example 4 in Table 2). 
5. Explanations indicating that all of the numbers up to the equal sign have 
been summed (i.e., the add-to-equal sign strategy, see Example 5 in Table 
LJ. 
6. Explanations indicating that one number on the left side of the equation has 
been carried over and placed in the blank (the carry strategy, see Example 6 
in Table 2). 
Spoken explanations that could not be categorized as one of these six strat- 
egies were classified as “idiosyncratic. ” These explanations typically included 
imprecise information (e.g., “I added them”), an uninterpretable grouping of 
the components of the problem (e.g., “I added the 6 and the 9” for the problem 
in Table 2), or reference to numbers that did not appear in the problem and could 
not be derived by addition or subtraction from the numbers that did appear in the 
problem (e.g., “I added 12” for the problem in Table 2). 
Coding Gesture Alone. We first established a lexicon of gestures using the 
information conveyed in gesture and speech in explanations produced by com- 
parably aged children in pilot work. We employed the criteria developed in 
Goldin-Meadow (1979; see also Feldman, Goldin-Meadow, & Gleitman, 1978; 
Goldin-Meadow & Mylander, 1984) to isolate gestures from the flow of manual 
behaviors and to describe the form of those gestures. We then used three sources 
to help attribute meaning to each gesture. 
1. We relied heavily on the form of the gesture itself; for example, a hand 
closing in a grabbing motion can be considered a metaphoric representation 
of putting together a group of numbers; we therefore tentatively assigned the 
meaning “group” to the hand grab form. 
2. We used placemenf of the gesture; for example, if the hand grab was typ- 
ically placed under the two numbers in the addition problem that could be 
grouped to solve the problem (the 4 and the 6 in the problem in Table 2), we 
took this as evidence that this gesture did indeed mean “group.” 
3. We used the speech that typically accompanied the gesture; for example, if 
the hand grab form typically occurred when a child said, “I grouped the 4 
and the 6,” this frequent pairing of gesture and speech further supported the 
inference of the meaning of the gesture as “group.” 
We found that these three sources tended to converge on a single meaning for 
each gesture. This iterative procedure applied to pilot data allowed the establish- 
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ment of the following lexicon of gestures (described in terms of form and 
meaning). 
1. Finger points were interpreted as referring to the elements they indicated. 
The children used points to indicate the numbers in the problems (interpreted 
as a reference to the particular number indicated), the equal sign (interpreted 
as “equals”), the blank (interpreted as “the answer”), and addition signs 
(interpreted as “add the two adjacent addends”). If the child pointed to the 
4, the addition sign, and the 6 in the problem in Table 2, the sequence would 
be interpreted as “add 4 and 6;” if the child pointed at an addition sign but 
no numbers were indicated, the sequence would also be interpreted as “add 
the two numbers adjacent to the addition sign.” 
2. Hand sweeps or hand sweeps back and forth, were interpreted as “add 
together all of the elements within the expanse of the sweep.” 
3. Hand grabs or clasps, which were typically performed at or just below two 
numbers, were interpreted as “group these numbers together.” 
4. Hand pulls or sweeps down, which were typically performed over one or 
more numbers, were interpreted as “subtract or take away these numbers.” 
This lexicon of gestures established in previous work was used to code the 
gestural responses found on the videotapes for this study. After a first coder had 
transcribed the videotapes focusing on speech alone (with the picture turned off), 
a second coder (with the sound turned off) transcribed the gestures on the vid- 
eotapes. We found that the children combined their gestural forms into strings 
that conveyed the information central to each of the six spoken strategies (see 
Table 2). The gestures in each explanation were classified as conveying one of 
the six strategies displayed in Table 2 or, if no strategy was discernable, as 
“idiosyncratic” (i.e., children indicated elements of the problem but did not 
combine the elements into any of the strategies identified). 
Coding the Relationship between Gesture and Speech. In the final step, the 
coders compared the speech code and the gesture code for each explanation to 
determine whether the gestured and spoken strategies matched. If the strategy 
conveyed in gesture was the same as the strategy conveyed in speech, then the 
explanation was categorized as a march (see Table 2 for examples of matched 
gesture-plus-speech explanations for each of the six verbal strategies). If a ges- 
ture string of the sort exemplified in Table 2 was produced with a verbal explana- 
tion that conveyed a different strategy, a gesture/speech mismatch was coded. 
For example, for the problem 4 + 6 + 9 = - + 9, if a child pointed at the 4, 
6, and 9 on the left side of the equation, the 9 on the right side of the equation, 
and then the blank (an add-all strategy conveyed in gesture) but said “I added 4 
@US 6 plus 9 equals 19” (an add-to-equal sign strategy conveyed in speech), his 
response would be coded as a mismatch. Responses in which one modality 
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conveyed an identifiable strategy but the second modality conveyed an idiosyn- 
cratic response ( 15% of the explanations) were also considered mismatches. 
(There were no responses in which idiosyncratic strategies were conveyed in 
both modalities.) Explanations containing speech alone (33% of all explanations) 
were not coded for matches or mismatches (and none of the children produced 
explanations containing gesture alone with no speech). 
Interrater reliability was established by having additional trained coders tran- 
scribe a subset of the tapes of the testing sessions in the manner described above. 
Reliability was 95% agreement (N = 37) between coders for coding speech 
alone, 87% (N = 38) for coding gesture alone. and 86% (N = 36) for coding the 
relationship between gesture and speech. 
Coding the Posttest and Generalization Test 
The number of correct solutions a child produced on the posttest was noted; a 
child was considered successful on the posttest if he was correct on at least 5 of 
the 6 problems. In addition, the number of correct responses a child produced on 
each of the 7 problems on the generalization task (2 addition problems in a new 
form, 2 multiplication problems, and 3 interview questions) was noted; a child 
was considered successful on the generalization test if he was correct on at least 6 
of the 7 problems. 
RESULTS 
Performance on the Pretest: Discordance 
in Mathematical Equivalence 
Thirty of the 37 children were found to produce gestures with at least some of 
their verbal explanations’; 21 children produced gestures with all six of their 
explanations. Gesture-plus-speech explanations were therefore quite common: 
On average, the children produced 4.4 out of 6 explanations (5.3 if the 7 
nongesturers are excluded) containing both gesture and speech, accounting for 
73% of all explanations (89% excluding the 7 nongesturers). 
Looking at the relationship between the information conveyed in gesture and 
in speech within an explanation, we found that 29% of the 222 explanations 
(40% of the 160 explanations containing both gesture and speech) produced by 
all of the children were mismatches (i.e., the strategy conveyed in gesture failed 
to match the strategy conveyed in speech). 
We next looked at the production of mismatched explanations by individual 
children and found that the children varied considerably in the numbers of 
z The 7 children who did not gesture at all were, by default. classified as concordant. It is 
important to note, however, that if these 7 non-gesturers are eliminated from the analyses. concordant 
children are still less likely to benefit from instruction than discordant children (35% VS. 62%. 
respectively, see Table 3). 
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mismatched explanations they produced, with one child producing as many as 
six (out of six) mismatched explanations and others producing no mismatches at 
all. Following Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986). we classified children as 
either discordant or concordant on the basis of the number of mismatched re- 
sponses each child produced: Children who produced three or more (out of six) 
explanations in which gesture did not match speech were classified as “discor- 
dant”: children who produced fewer than three mismatched explanations were 
classified as “concordant.” Using this criterion, we found that 24 of the 37 
children were concordant and 13 were discordant. The concordant children pro- 
duced an average of 0.8 mismatched gesture-plus-speech explanations (SD 
= .99, range 0 to 2). and the discordant children produced an average of 3.8 
mismatched gesture-plus-speech explanations (SD = .9 I, range 3 to 6). 
Despite the difference in the number of gesture-speech mismatches they pro- 
duced, the concordant and discordant children were similar to one another on a 







Age (mean age was IO years, I month for the 24 concordant children and 9 
years, I I months for the I3 discordant children). 
Sex (there were I2 girls and I2 boys in the concordant group, and 8 girls and 
5 boys in the discordant group). 
Grade (there were I I fourth graders and I3 fifth graders in the concordant 
group. and 8 fourth graders and 5 fifth graders in the discordant group). 
Ability to explain mathematical equivalence verbally (the proportion of 
equivalence strategies, i.e., grouping, equalize, and add-subtract, expressed 
in spoken explanations on the pretest was .Ol [2 out of 1681 for the concor- 
dant children and 0 [out of 781 for the discordant children). 
Scores on standardized achievement tests in math (mean grade equivalent 
level was 4.4 for the concordant group and 3.9 for the discordant group; 
grade equivalent level was used to compare the children because the schools 
used different testing instruments). 
We found the same proportion of concordant and discordant children in each 
of the five schools that participated in the study. 
In general, we found that, on every background characteristic examined, concor- 
dant children did not differ from discordant children, and that the only dimension 
along which the two groups of children were distinct was the number of gesture- 
speech mismatches they produced.3 
3 In order IO determine whether the minimal differences between the discordant and concordant 
children in ape. grade. and math level might have accounted for the differences between the children 
in success after training, we did a multiple regression analysis using age, grade, math level, and 
discordance as variables IO predict success on the posttest and the generalization test. We found that 
the proportion of variance explained by the combination of all four variables descreased significantly 
when discordance was removed from the regression, but not when each of the other three variables 
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Performance on the Posttest and Generalization Test Problems 
Table 3 presents the proportion of children classified as concordant or discordant 
on the pretest who improved in problem solutions after training (recall that all of 
the children failed on all six addition problems on the pretest). The children fell 
into three groups on the basis of their performance on the problems in the posttest 
and generalization test: 
1. No success on either the posttest or the generalization test. 
2. Success on the posttest (which included only addition problems) but not on 
the generalization test (which included multiplication problems as well). 
3. Success on both the posttest and the generalization test (that is, success on 
both the addition and the multiplication problems).4 
None of the children was successful on the generalization test without also 
succeeding on the addition posttest. 
As can be seen in Table 3, when the instruction was effective, it resulted in 
success on both addition and multiplication (i.e., very few of the children suc- 
ceeded on the addition posttest without also succeeding on the generalization 
test). The relevant result for our purposes, however, is the fact that the discordant 
children were more likely than the concordant children to benefit from the 
instruction: 62% of the 13 discordant children were successful on both the 
posttest and the generalization test after training, compared to only 25% of the 24 
concordant children (x*(l) = 4.47, p < .025, one-tailed).5 
(age, grade, math level) was removed, suggesting that the discordance variable explained variance in 
success above and beyond the variance explained by the other three variables. 
4 Recall that a child was considered successful on the posttest or the generalization test if he was 
correct on at least 5 of the 6 posttest problems or 6 of the 7 generalization test problems. In fact, most 
of the children considered successful on either test were correct on the entire posttest or generaliza- 
tion test: I4 (82%) of the I7 children considered successful on the posttest were ‘correct on all 6 
posttest problems, and I2 (85%) of the 14 children considered successful on the generalization test 
were correct on all 7 generalization test problems. If we were to apply a more lenient criterion for 
success on the generalization test, allowing a child to be considered successful if he answered any of 
the 7 generalization test problems correctly, the pattern of results presented in Table 3 remains 
unchanged. Using this lenient criterion for success on the generalization test, 85% of the I3 discor- 
dant were successful after training, compared to only 33% of the 24 concordant children ($(I) = 
3.36, p < .05, one-tailed, see Table 3). 
5 Note that children were classified as discordant or not. and as successful or not, based on 
predetermined criteria; that is, both discordance and success were considered categorical variables in 
our analyses. The decision to treat discordance and success as categorical was, to a certain extent, 
arbitrary. However, it is important to note that if discordance and success are considered continuous 
variables (i.e., children are classified according to the number of mismatched responses they pro- 
duced on the pretest, and according to the number of problems they answered correctly on the posttest 
and generalization test), the results remain essentially unchanged: 33% of the variance in success 
measured as a continuous variable was accounted for by discordance measured as a continuous 
variable (F(l.36) = 4.26, p = .OS), compared to 41% of the variance in success measured as a 
categorical variable accounted for by discordance measured as a categorical variable (F( 1.36) = 
6.95, p = .Ol). 
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Table 3. Proportion of Concordant and Discordant 
Children Improving after Training on Addition 
Concordant Discordant 
Post-Training Children Children 
Performance (It = 24) (II = 13) 
Success on posttest and .25 .62* 
generalization test 
Success on posttest only .08 .08 
No success on posttest .6-l .3l 
*p < .02, using x2, comparing concordant and discordant 
children at the highest level of success 
The Effect of Training on a Child’s Explanations 
Up to this point, we have examined the effect of training on the children’s 
performance on the addition and multiplication problems in the post-training 
tests. We now ask whether, in addition, the training had an effect on the chil- 
dren’s explanations of their problem solutions. To do so, we compared the 
explanations the children produced on the pretest and the posttest. 
Coding Explanations On the Pretest and the Posttest. Each explanation 
was classified as a match or a mismatch as described above. In addition, we 
classified each gesture-plus-speech match and mismatch according to the level of 
explanation(s) conveyed: 
1. Nonequivalence if both gesture and speech conveyed rationales at the non- 
equivalence level, 
2. Equivalence if both gesture and speech conveyed rationales at the equiv- 
alence level, 
3. Mixed if one modality conveyed a nonequivalence rationale and the other 
modality conveyed an equivalence rationale. 
Note that, in a mismatching response, the strategy conveyed in speech, by 
definition, does not match the strategy conveyed in gesture; we are interested 
here in whether the two mismatching strategies were at the same level (non- 
equivalence or equivalence) or at different levels (mixed). 
Children were classified into groups on the basis of the number of mismatched 
responses they produced (concordant or discordant) and on the basis of the level 
of their most frequent response (nonequivalent, equivalent, or mixed). Note that 
the concordant child could not be classified at the mixed level simply because, in 
a matching response, the strategy (and therefore the level) conveyed in speech is 
identical to the strategy (and level) conveyed in gesture, that is, the level cannot 
be mixed across the two modalities. Since, by definition, the concordant child’s 
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most frequent response was a matching response (or a speech alone response if 
the child failed to gesture on a majority of explanations), the concordant child 
could not have produced many responses which contained an equivalence strat- 
egy in one modality and a nonequivalence strategy in the other modality; that is. 
the concordant child’s responses could not, on average, be at the mixed level. 
Thus, each child was classified into one of five categories based on that child’s 
predominant explanation (although, in principle, a child could have produced 
three responses at one level and three at another, this pattern never occurred; in 






Concordant nonequivalent (Type I). where the child produces predomi- 
nantly gesture-plus-speech tmtches (or speech alone responses) at the tlott- 
cyuilwlet~t level. 
Discordant nonequivalent (Type 2). where the child produces predominantly 
gesture-plus-speech tnistnntches at the tzot~eq~rivuletzt level. 
Discordant mixed (Type 3). where the child produces predominantly ges- 
ture-plus-speech tnisttuJtches in which notzequivalence rationales exist side- 
by-side with equivo/ettce rationales. 
Discordant equivalent (Type 4), where the child produces predominantly 
gesture-plus-speech tt~istmtclzes at the qwivtzletzt level. 
Concordant equivalent (Type 5), where the child produces predominantly 
gesture-plus-speech tnotckes (or speech alone responses) at the equivalent 
level. 
WC arranged the five categories in the above order based on the assumption 
that the discordant state is a transient state, one which follows a concordant (non- 
understanding) state and precedes a concordant (understanding) state. One might 
therefore expect children who are acquirin, 0 mathematical equivalence to begin 
the process at a concordant nonequivalent state, pass through a series of discor- 
dant states differing in level of knowledge (nonequivalence, mixed non- 
equivalence. and equivalence, equivalence), and return eventually to a concor- 
dant state, but concordant with respect to a new level of knowledge, the equiv- 
alencc level. 
Pretest Explanations. We first classified children according to their pre- 
dominant explanation on the pretest. These data are shown in Table 4. Not 
surprisingly, given that none of the children could correctly solve any of the 
addition problems on the paper-and-pencil pretest, all 24 of the concordant 
children were at the concordant nonequivalent level (Type I) and 12 of the I3 
discordant children were at the discordant nonequivalent level (Type 2). The 
remaining discordant child was at the mixed level (Type 3). No child on the 
pretest was found to be at either the discordant equivalent level (Type 4) or the 
concordant equivalent level (Type 5). 
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Table 4. Number of Children Producing the Five Types of Explanations 
on the Pretest and on the Posttest” 
Predominant Type of Explanation 
Type I Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
Concordant Discordant Discordant Discordant Concordant 
Nonequivalent Nonequivalent Mixed Equivalent Equivalent 
Pretest 74 I2 I 0 0 
POSllCSl IS 2 x (1 h 
2’Children wcrc ca[cgorized on the hasis of their prcdominan~ ~ypc ol’ cxpluurion (SW Tess). 
Posttest Explanations. Our next task was to reclassify the children after 
instruction according to their predominant explanation on the posttest. These 
data are also presented in Table 4 (lower row). The most obvious change from 
the pretest data is that, after instruction, more children were found at the discor- 
dant mixed level (Type 3) and, for the first time, children could be found at the 
discordant equivalent (Type 4) and concordant equivalent (Type 5) levels. Be- 
fore training, only I of the 37 children was found to produce explanations of 
Types 3, 4, or 5; after training, 20 of the 37 children were found to produce 
explanations of these three types. 
Thus, training did alter the way in which the children explained their problem 
solutions on the posttest. The crucial question, however, is whether training was 
more likely to alter posttest explanations in discordant children than in concor- 
dant children. To address this question, we calculated the proportions of concor- 
dant and discordant children who altered their explanations on the posttest. For 
this analysis, we attempted to equate level of knowledge and looked only at the 
nonequivalent children (i.e., we included the 24 concordant nonequivalent chil- 
dren and the 12 discordant nonequivalent children, and omitted the 1 discordant 
child at the mixed level). The results are presented in Table 5. Only I of the 12 
(8%) children classified as discordant nonequivalent on the pretest produced the 
same type of explanation on the posttest as on the pretest, compared to 14 of the 
24 (58%) children classified as concordant nonequivalent on the pretest (x2( 1) = 
8.23, p < ,005, one-tailed). Moreover, 58% (7 of 12) of the children who were 
discordant nonequivalent on the pretest produced equivalence explanations 
(Types 4 or 5) after training, compared to only 2 1% (5 of 24) of the children who 
were concordant nonequivalent on the pretest (x’(1) = 3.52, p < .05, one- 
tailed). 
In sum, we have shown that, after training, the discordant children were not 
only more likely to improve on problem solutions than the concordant children, 
but were also more likely to alter (and, in fact, improve) their explanations than 
the concordant children. Predictably, we found that the children who were SW- 
cessful on the post-training problems were the same children who produced 
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Table 5. Proportion of Children Who Were Concordant or Discordant 
Nonequivalent on the Pretest Classilied According to Their Predominant Type 
of Exolanation on the Posttest 
Predominant Type of Explanation on the Posttest 
Type I Type 2 TYPO 3 TYPC 4 Type 5 
Concordant Discordant Discordant Discordant Concordant 




(N = 24) 
.5x ” .04 .I7 .I3 .ou 
Discordant .08 .ou ” .25 .‘S .33 
Noncquivalcnt 
(N = 12) 
.‘Prcrcsl status was determined by the child’s predominant type of cxplanarion on the pretest: 
concordant noncquivalcnr (Type I) or discordant noncquivalcnl (Type 2). The one child who pry 
duced predominantly discordant mixed explanations (Type 3) on the prctcsr was not included in this 
analysis. 
I’Thcsc proportions rcprcsenl the proportions of concordant nonequivalent children and discordant 
children who did nor alter their explanations after training, i.e., thc.propurtions of children who 
produced the same prcdominanl explanation on hoth the prctcsl and the posttcst. 
posttest explanations with equivalence in gesture and/or speech (i.e., explana- 
tions of Types 3, 4, or 5; see Table 6). It is not particularly surprising that the 
children should begin to produce equivalence strategies in speech after training 
since the instruction itself contained a verbal equivalence explanation (an abbre- 
viated version of the equalize strategy). However, since the trainer was careful to 
gesture during the instruction only in a stylized fashion that did not reflect any 
particular strategy (videotapes taken of the training session confirmed that she 
did indeed gesture in this fashion to all subjects), the children received no model 
of a gestured equivalence strategy. Nevertheless, 17 of the 20 children who 
produced explanations of Types 3. 4, or 5 after training produced equivalence 
strategies in gesture (and only 6 of these children had produced equivalence 
strategies in gesture before training). Thus, the children had not just mimicked a 
verbal equivalence explanation provided by the experimenter, but had created 
new gestured explanations at the equivalence level. 
Is the Discordant Child More Knowledgeable than 
the Concordant Child? 
Discordant children, by definition, produce two different strategies for the same 
problem and, in this sense, “know more” or at least express more about a single 
problem than concordant children. The question we now ask is whether discor- 
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Table 6. Relationship between Esplanations and Success on Problems 
after Training.’ 
Predominant Type of Explanation on the Posttest 
Performance on Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
Prohlems after Concordant Discordant Discordant Discordant Concnrdant 
Training Nonequivalent Nonequivalent Mixed Equivalent Equivalent 
No SUCCL’~S I4 2 4 
success on posl- I I I 
ICSI onlp 
Success on posl- 3 5 h 
tcsI and een- 
crsliz;ltion 
~‘Number of children classified according 10 (I) pcrformuncc on the post-training addilion and 
mulriplicarion problems and (2) predominant type 01’ cxplanalion afrcr training. 
dant children are, in fact, more knowledgeable about equivalence in mathe- 
matical problems than concordant children when we look, not at their responses 
to a single problem, but at their responses across the set of six problems. In other 
words, we ask whether discordant children have more strategies in their reper- 
toires overall than concordant children. A difference of this sort might explain 
why the discordant children are more likely to benefit from instruction than the 
concordant children. 
To investigate this question, we examined pretest performances and again 
equated for level of knowledge, including only the nonequivalent children in our 
analyses (i.e., we eliminated the one discordant child at the mixed level who, by 
definition, produced a larger proportion of equivalence responses than the non- 
equivalent children). We calculated the mean number of nonequivalence and 
equivalence strategies produced by the 24 concordant nonequivalent children and 
the I2 discordant nonequivalent children before training (i.e., on the pretest). A 
child was given credit for a particular strategy if he produced that strategy at least 
once in gesture or in speech in any of his six explanations. The maximum 
number of different strategies a child could produce was three for the non- 
equivalence strategies (add-all, add-to-equal sign, carry) and three for the equiv- 
alence strategies (grouping, add-subtract, equalize). The data are presented in 
Table 7. Although the discordant children produced slightly more types of strat- 
egies on average than the concordant children, this difference was not reliable for 
either the nonequivalence strategies (t(34) = I .28, n.s.) or the equivalence 
strategies (t(34) = 1.77, n.s.). These data suggest that the number of strategies 
available to the discordant children was comparable to the number available to 
the concordant children. 
The feature that distinguishes discordant children from concordant children 
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Table 7. Mean Number of Types of Strategies Produced 
in Gesture and/or in Speech Across the Six Explanations 








(N = 12) 
Noncquivalcncc smtcgics 
(OUI of 3) 
1.50 1.75 
Equivalence slratcgics 
(out of 3) 
.21 .S8 
thus does not appear to be the types of strategies the children know, but rather the 
ability to produce those strategies as explanations for the same problem. Produc- 
ing two strategies to explain a single problem may allow the discordant child to 
consider the relationship more easily (and the potential conflict) between those 
strategies. For example, consider a child who produces an add-all strategy in 
gesture and an add-to-equal sign strategy in speech. These two strategies lead to 
incompatible solutions to the addition problems (the add-all strategy applied to 
the following problem, 4 + 6 + 9 = - + 9, gives the sum 28, while the add- 
to-equal sign strategy gives the sum 19). The conflict between these two strat- 
egies may be more apparent when seen side-by-side across two modalities, and 
an awareness of this conflict may play a role in pushing the child toward an 
understanding of equivalence. 
Whether or not the child is able to make use of the two pieces of information 
he expresses simultaneously, our data suggest that the discordant nonequivalent 
child differs from the concordant nonequivalent child, not in terms of how much 
he knows about equivalence, but in terms of the amount of information he can 
communicate at one time with respect to a particular equivalence problem. These 
findings suggest that the discordant child may have a relatively large informa- 
tion-processing capacity with respect to the particular problem on which he is 
discordant, a capacity that allows him to take in and profit from information 
relevant to that problem. 
The Modality of Expression: Does Equivalence Appear in 
Gesture before Speech? 
The final issue we considered is how the concordant and discordant children used 
the two different modalities to express their strategies. That is, we ask whether 
certain strategies are more likely to appear in gesture, in speech, or in both 
modalities. We included in this analysis the pretest explanations of the 12 discor- 
dant nonequivalent children and the 17 concordant nonequivalent children who 
produced gestures along with their spoken explanations (i.e., we excluded the 7 
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concordant children who produced no gestures at all).” We classified the children 
into three groups according to the modality they used to express their non- 
cquivalencc strategies and their equivalence strategies: 
I. Children who produced at least one nonequivalence (or equivalence) strat- 
egy in borh Restuw UUI spwh; a child did not have to produce the strategy 
simultaneously in gesture and in speech to be included in this category, but 
mercly had to produce the strategy in gesture and the same strategy in speech 
sometime across the set of six explanations. 
2. Children who produced at least one nonequivalence (or equivalence) strat- 
egy in .s~~~cc/r but did not produce that strategy at any time across the six 
explanations in gesture. 
3. Children who produced at least one nonequivalence (or equivalence) strat- 
egy in gesfurc but did not produce that strategy at any time across the six 
explanations in speech. 
Table 8 presents the proportion of concordant and discordant children who 
expressed nonequivalence and equivalence strategies in both gesture and speech, 
in speech but not gesture, or in gesture but not speech. Note that almost all of the 
children produced nonequivalence strategies in both gesture and in speech. In 
contrast, none of the children produced the more advanced equivalence strategies 
in both modalities. The concordant and discordant children did differ, however, 
in the modality in which equivalence appeared. The concordant children were 
equally likely to produce equivalence in speech or gesture: 2 concordant children 
( 12%) produced an equivalence strategy in speech but not gesture, and 3 ( 18%) 
produced an equivalence strategy in gesture but not speech. In contrast, all 7 of 
the discordant children (58%) who produced an equivalence strategy produced 
that strategy in gesture but not speech. Overall, the discordant children were 
more likely than the concordant children to produce an equivalence strategy in 
gesture but not speech (7 of the I2 discordant children vs. 3 of the I7 concordant 
children, p = .027, Fisher Exact Test). These data suggest that, at least for the 
discordant children, when equivalence first appears in a child’s repertoire, it 
tends to appear in gesture and not in speech. 
Summary 
We have shown that, when asked to explain their solutions to problems in 
mathematical equivalence, a subset of children who had not yet acquired the 
concept produced a large proportion of explanations in which the information 
conveyed in gesture did not match the information conveyed in speech. Thus, 
b All of the 7 concordant children who did not gesture produced only noncquivalencc strategies in 
speech; none of these children produced cquivalcnce strategies. 
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Table 8. Proportion of Children Classified According to the Modality 
Used to Express Nonequivalence and Equivalence Strategies on the Pretest 
Nonequivalence Strategies Equivalence Strategies 
Expressed in Expressed in 
Gesture Speech Gesture Gesture Speech Gesture 
and but not but not and but not but not 
Speech Gesture Speech Speech Gesture Speech 
Concordanl nonequivalent .X8 .I2 00 .oo .I2 .I8 
children (N = 17)da 
Discordant nonequivalent I .oo .oo .oo .oo .oo .58 
children (N = I?) 
.‘7 ot’ the 24 concordanl noncquivalcnt children did not gcsturc a~ all on the pretest. These 7 
children arc not included in this analysis. 
discordance was found in a second concept (the first being conservation, see 
Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986), a finding which suggests that discordance 
may be a general cognitive phenomenon and is not tied to any particular concept, 
age, or developmental stage. 
Moreover, we found that, within a group of children who had not yet acquired 
mathematical equivalence (as reflected in the absence of correct solutions on the 
paper-and-pencil pretest), the subset of children who produced a large proportion 
of gesture/speech mismatches on the pretest (i.e., the discordant children) were 
more likely to benefit from instruction than the subset of children who produced 
few such mismatches (i.e.. the concordant children). These data suggest that 
gesture/speech discordance can be used as a genera1 marker of transitional 
knowledge, one that can potentially be used with a wide range of concepts. 
STUDY 2 
It is our hypothesis that an individual who is grappling with a particular concept, 
possessing an unstable and still-forming understanding of that concept, will 
produce gesture/speech mismatches when explaining that concept. Under this 
hypothesis, a child would produce mismatched responses for a concept he is in 
the process of mastering but not for a concept he has either mastered or has not 
yet begun to tackle. To investigate whether the discordant state is indeed con- 
cept-specific, fourth-grade students (i.e., 9- and IO-year-olds) were tested on 
two tasks: mathematical equivalence and conservation. Our goal was to deter- 
mine how the same children would perform in terms of stability of understanding 
(i.e., discordance and concordance) on a task tapping a concept they were likely 
to be in the process of mastering (i.e., mathematical equivalence) versus a task 
tapping a concept they were likely to have already mastered (i.e., conservation). 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Twenty-four children from the fourth and fifth grades of a Chicago Public School 
participated in the paper-and-pencil addition test. These children represent a 
different sample from the children who participated in Study I. The children 
ranged in age from 9;2 to IO;6 (mean age 9;9). 
Procedure 
Each child was tested individually and particiated first in a series of 6 Piagetian 
conservation tasks: 2 liquid, 2 length, and 2 number tasks (see Church & Goldin- 
Meadow, 1986, for the details of the tasks). For each conservation task, the child 
was asked to judge whether a quantity was the “same” or “different” after a 
transformation altering the appearance but not the quantity, and to explain each 
judgment. 
After participating in the conservation tasks, the child was then administered a 
paper-and-pencil test containing the six addition problems used in Study 1 (see 
Table I). As in Study 1, after the child had solved the problems, an experimenter 
went to the blackboard with the child, wrote the first problem (including the 
child’s solution) on the board, and asked the child, “Can you tell me how you 
figured out that answer?” The experimenter continued until the child had ex- 
plained the solutions to all six problems. Children’s explanations of their answers 
to both the conservation and the mathematical equivalence tasks were video- 
taped. 
Coding 
Coding the Conservation Judgments. The conservation task was coded 
first for judgments and then for explanations. Children who produced a “same” 
judgment on all six of the conservation tasks were classifed as conservers. 
Children who produced a “same” judgment on some of the six conservation 
tasks and a “different” judgment on other tasks were classified as partial con- 
servers. Children who produced “different” judgments on all six tasks were 
classified as nonconservers. 
Coding the Conservation Explanations. Coding was accomplished in three 
steps: (I) speech was coded alone, (2) gesture was coded alone, and (3) the 
relationship between speech and gesture was coded. Each explanation was coded 
first for speech alone. With the picture turned off, one coder listened only to the 
audio portion of the tapes and coded the information conveyed in the children’s 
speech independently of gesture. Spoken explanations were classified into three 
types: equivalence, nonequivalence, and noncomparative. Equivalence explana- 
tions focused on the equivalence between the object’s transformed and original 
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states (e.g., “the dish is short but it’s wide,” or “you could pour the water back 
into the glass”). Nonequivalence explanations focused on the nonequivalence 
between the object’s two states (e.g., “you poured the water into the dish,” or 
“the dish is short and the glass is tall”). Noncomparative explanations failed to 
focus on a comparison at all (e.g., “that’s a dish,” or “the dish is short;” see 
Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986, for further details and examples of these 
coding categories). 
A second coder then viewed the videotapes, this time with the sound turned 
off, and coded the information conveyed in the children’s gestures. Gestured 
explanations could also be classified into the same three categories: equivalence 
(e.g., a pouring motion from the dish to the glass, indicating how the original 
transformation could be reversed), nonequivalence (e.g., a flat palm held first at 
the height of the water in the dish and then at the height of the water in the glass, 
thereby focusing on a dimension where the two objects differed) and noncom- 
parative (e.g., a flat palm indicating only the height of the water in the dish). 
In the final step, the coders compared the speech code and the gesture code for 
each explanation to determine whether that explanation was a match or a mis- 
match. An explanation was categorized as a match if gesture expressed the same 
or a subset of the information that was expressed in speech (e.g., a description of 
reversing the pouring action in the water task, “If you poured the water back.” 
said while gesturing the same information, a pouring motion from the dish to the 
glass). An explanation was categorized as a mismatch if gesture expressed differ- 
ent or additional information from that expressed in speech (e.g., a verbal de- 
scription of the action performed on the objects, “You poured water from the 
glass into the dish,” said while gesturing information about one of the dimen- 
sions of the objects, a flat palm demarcating first the height of the water in the 
glass and then the height of the water in the dish). Explanations containing 
speech alone were not coded for matches or mismatches (and none of the chil- 
dren produced explanations containing gesture alone with no speech). 
Interrater reliability was established by having additional trained coders tran- 
scribe a subset of the tapes of the testing sessions in the manner described above. 
Reliability was 88% (n = 36) agreement between coders for coding speech 
alone, 88% (n = 34) for coding gesture alone, and 97% (n = 35) for coding the 
relationship between gesture and speech. 
Coding the Mathematical Equivalence Paper-and-Pencil Addition Test. 
The number of problems the children solved correctly on the paper-and-pencil 
test was recorded. 
Coding the Mathematical Equivalence Explanations. Explanations were 
coded for speech alone, gesture alone, and the relationship between gesture and 
speech, as described in Study 1. 
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Results 
Discordance in Mathematical Equivalence. Fourteen of the 24 children 
(58%) were incorrect on all six problems on the paper-and-pencil addition test. 
Eight (33%) were correct on some of the problems, and 2 (8%) were correct on 
all of the problems. Thus, most of the children had not yet acquired mathematical 
equivalence.’ 
In terms of the explanations produced to justify their problem solutions, 21 of 
the 24 children were found to produce gestures with at least some of their verbal 
explanations; I3 of the 24 children produced gestures with all six of their expla- 
nations. On average, the children produced 4. I (out of 6) explanations contain- 
ing both gesture and speech. Overall, 49 of the 99 explanations (49%) containing 
both gesture and speech were coded as mismatches. There was a wide range of 
mismatched explanations produced by the children, ranging from 0 to 6 (out of 6) 
per child. Children were classified as “discordant” with respect to mathematical 
equivalence if they produced three or more explanations (out of six) in which 
gesture did not match speech, or as “concordant” if they produced fewer than 
three such mismatches. 
Using this criterion, 9 of the 24 children (38%) were found to be discordant 
with respect to mathematical equivalence-approximately the same proportion 
of children found to be discordant with respect to mathematical equivalence in 
Study I (i.e., I3 of the 37 children, 35%). Mean age was 9;l I for the discordant 
children and 9;9 for the concordant children. The mean number of mismatched 
explanations was 4.44 (SD = I .33, range from 3 to 6) for the discordant children 
and .60 (SD = .74, range from 0 to 2) for the concordant children. 
Discordance in Conservation. All 24 of the children produced at least one 
“same” judgment on the six conservation tasks (i.e., none of the children were 
nonconservers). Fourteen of the 24 children (58%) produced “‘same” judgments 
on all six tasks (i.e., they were ,full conservers), and the remaining IO children 
(4 1%) produced “same” judgments on some of the six tasks (i.e., they were 
partial conservers). 
In terms of the explanations produced to justify their judgments, all 24 of the 
children produced gestures with at least some of their verbal explanations of 
conservation. On average, the children produced 4.6 (out of 6) explanations 
containing both gesture and speech. Overall, 32 of the I IO explanations (29%) 
containing both gesture and speech were coded as mismatched explanations. 
’ Note that the percentage of children who were successful on some or all of the six addition 
problems was considerably higher in Study 2 (41%, IO out of 24) than u was on the pretest in Study I 
(WC. 3 out of 40). The public school that the children in Study 2 attended (which was within a 
university community) had a somewhat more advanced math curriculum than the other schools in our 
sample, a difference which may have contributed to the Study 2 children’s relatively good perfor- 
mance on our addition test. 
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There was a range of mismatched explanations produced by the children, from 0 
to 4 (out of 6) per child. Children were classified as “discordant” with respect to 
conservation if they produced three or more explanations (out of six) in which 
gesture did not match speech, or a>: “concordant” if they produced fewer than 
three such mismatches. 
Only 4 of the 24 children (17%) were found to be discordant with respect to 
conservation. The small number of discordant children is predictable given that 
the children ranged in age from 9 to I 1 years and therefore already knew a great 
deal about conservation (as reflected in their “‘same” judgments). In our pre- 
vious studies of conservation in 5- to 8-year-old children who were in the process 
of acquiring conservation, we found that as many as 46% of these younger 
children (N = 80) were discordant on these same conservation tasks (see Studies 
I and 2 in Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986). Mean age was 9; 10 for the 4 
discordant children and 9;9 for the 21 concordant children in this study. The 
mean number of mismatched explanations was 3.25 (SD = .50, range from 3 to 
4) for the discordant children and .95 (SD = .83, range from 0 to 2) for the 
concordant children. 
Discordance in Two Concepts. To determine whether a child could be 
discordant on one of the two concepts but concordant on the other, the children 
were classified according to their discordance status on both concepts. Of the 9 
children who were discordant on mathematical equivalence, 3 were discordant 
on conservation as well, while 6 of those 9 were discordant on mathematical 
equivalence but concordant on conservation. In addition, one child was concor- 
dant on mathematical equivalence but discordant on conservation. The remaining 
14 children in the study were concordant on both concepts. Thus, almost a third 
of the 24 children in this sample were discordant on one concept but concordant 
on the other. These data are displayed in Table 9. 
Types of Gesture-Plus-Speech Explanations in the Two Concepts. We also 
classified the children according to the type of predominant gesture-plus-speech 
explanation they produced on each of the two tasks, as described in Study 1. 
Since, as a group, the children had less knowledge of mathematical equivalence 
Table 9. Proportion of Children who were Concordant 
or Discordant with Respect to Mathematical Equivalence 
and Conservation 
Concordant on conservation 




.x3 (Iv = 14) 




25 (N = 6) 
.I3 (N = 3) 
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than of conservation, we might expect that the children would produce explana- 
tions at a lower level for mathematical equivalence than for conservation. Figure 
1 presents the number of children classified according to the predominant type of 
gesture-plus-speech explanation they produced on the mathematical equivalence 
task and on the conservation task. Note that, when the children were concordant 
with respect to mathematical equivalence, they tended to be concordant at the 
nonequivalent level, that is, they tended to produce predominantly Type 1 expla- 
nations. In contrast, when the children were concordant with respect to conserva- 
tion, they tended to be concordant at the equivalent level, that is, they tended to 
produce predominantly Type 5 responses. Thus, the children tended to produce 
different types of gesture-plus-speech responses for a concept, depending upon 
their level of mastery of that concept. 
Further evidence that gesture-plus-speech explanations reflect a child’s level 
of mastery of a given concept comes from an analysis of the relationship between 
the children’s explanations and their performance on the paper-and-pencil math 
test, or their performance on the same/different conservation judgments. Figure 
2 presents the proportion of children characterized by predominant type of expla- 
nation, classified according to their performance on the paper-and-pencil test for 
mathematical equivalence (none correct, some correct, all correct) or according 
to their performance on the same/different judgments for conservation (some 
“same” judgments, all six “same” judgments; recall that all of the children 
produced at least one “same” judgment). Note that the children who were 
incorrect on all six math problems were the only children to produce predomi- 
nantly Type 1 explanations, while the children who were correct on all of the 
problems produced predominantly Type 4 and 5 explanations. Similarly with 
respect to conservation, it was only the partial conservers who produced pre- 
dominantly Type 1 explanations, while the full conservers produced predomi- 
nantly Type 5 explanations. 
In sum, discordance does not appear to be a communicative style that inevita- 
bly characterizes a child’s explanations regardless of the concept that he or she is 
explaining. Rather, discordance appears to vary within the individual according 
to his understanding of the concept being explained. Thus, the data from this 
study are consistent with the hypothesis that discordance reflects the stability and 
level of a child’s understanding of a particular concept. 
STUDY 3 
The discordant child, by definition, says one thing while gesturing another and 
thus is inconsistent across the modalities he uses to express his beliefs about a 
concept. It is possible, however, that discordant children are inconsistent even 
when we consider only one modality, the verbal modality, and that it is this 
verbal inconsistency which is responsible for the discordant child’s heightened 
receptivity to instruction. In our previous work, we found that children who were 
Mathematical Equivalence 
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Type of Predomlnant Explanatlon a 
I’ Type I = concordant nonequivalent; Type 2 = discordant nonequivalent: Type 3 = discordant 
mixed: Type 4 = discordant equivalent; Type 5 = concordant equivalent 
Figure 1. Type of predominant explanation used by the 24 children in Study 2 on 
the mathematical equivalence task and the conservation task. 
0.6 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tw of Pndominrnl Explw~~Um ’ 
l Typo 1 . oonoordnnt nonaqulv~lwtt; Typa 2 I dlmoordml non~qulrmlml; 
Typa 3 - dl~aordwtt mIxad; Typm 4 . dlmoardanl non*qulvalenl; 
Type 6 . aonoordanl .qulrmlml 
Figure 2. Type of predominant explanation used by children who were correct on 
none, some, or all of the 6 test problems (i.e., the 6 addition problems on the 
mathematical equivalence task, and the 6 judgment problems on the conservation 
task). 
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discordant with respect to conservation also tended to be inconsistent in their 
verbal explanations of the concept (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986). In this 
study, we investigate whether children who are discordant with respect to mathe- 
matical equivalcncc will also be inconsistent in their verbal explanations of this 
concept. In addition, we determine whether the discordance measure is, in fact, a 
better predictor of success after training than verbal measures of inconsistency. 
METHOD 
Subjects and Procedure 
Fifty-nine children. ages 9 to 12. from private Catholic schools in the Chicago 
area participated in the paper-and-pencil addition test described in Study I (Table 
I). Children who were successful on all or some of the six problems on the test 
were eliminated from the study (7 children in the sample). The remaining 52 
children who gave incorrect solutions on all six of the problems comprised the 
subjects for the study. None of these children participated in either Study I or 
Study 2. 
After the child attempted to solve the problems, an experimenter went to the 
blackboard with the child, wrote the first problem (including the child’s solution) 
on the board, and asked the child, “Can you tell me how you figured out that 
answer’?” The experimenter continued until the child had explained the solutions 
to all six problems. The child’s responses were videotaped. 
Coding the Paper-and-Pencil Addition Test 
The number of problems answered correctly on the paper-and-pencil test was 
tabulated for each child. (As described above, the 7 children who solved some or 
all of the six problems correctly were eliminated from the study.) In addition, the 
particular solution for each problem was recorded in order to compare the con- 
sistency between a child’s solution to a problem and his explanation of that 
solution. 
Coding Explanations 
Explanations were coded for speech alone, gesture alone, and the relationship 
between gesture and speech as in Study I. Children were classified as “discor- 
dant” if they produced three or more explanations (out of six) in which gesture 
did not match speech. or as “concordant” if they produced fewer than three such 
explanations. 
RESULTS 
Explanations Expressed in Speech 
Each of the 52 children produced verbal explanations for all six of their (incor- 
rect) solutions to the problems on the paper-and-pencil test. Overall, only three 
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of these 3 12 verbal explanations exemplified a strategy that could lead to a 
correct solution, that is, the equivalence strategies of grouping (1%) and equalize 
(1%); there were no instances of the add-subtract equivalence strategy. 8 1% of 
the explanations exemplified strategies leading to incorrect solutions, that is, the 
nonequivalence strategies of add-all (57%). add-to-equal sign (19%), and carry 
(5%). The children produced idiosyncratic responses in 15% of their verbal 
explanations, and 2% of the responses were missing because the children spoke 
too softly for their verbal responses to be transcribed and coded. 
Explanations Expressed in Gesture 
Of the 52 children, 90% also produced gestured explanations, primarily in the 
foml of points, with some or all of their verbal explanations. As in the verbal 
explanations, few of the gestured explanations conveyed equivalence infomra- 
tion. The children produced 6 instances of grouping (3% of the 239 total gestured 
explanations), 17 instances of equalize (7%) and 4 instances of add-subtract 
(1%). In addition. 72% of the gestured explanations exemplified strategies lead- 
ing to incorrect solutions, that is, the nonequivalence strategies of add-all (45%). 
add-to-equal sign (24%). and carry (3%). The children produced idiosyncratic 
responses in 14% of their gestured explanations, and 2% of the responses were 
missed because the camera was positioned in such a way that the gestures were 
not visible. 
Note that, although small, the incidence of gestured explanations expressing 
equivalence (11% of 239) was larger than the incidence of verbal explanations 
expressing equivalence (2% of 312; r(311) = 4.76, p < ,001). Similarly, in an 
analysis by child, the number of children who produced equivalence explana- 
tions in gesture (20 out of 52) was found to be larger than the number who 
produced equivalence explanations in speech (3 out of 52; f(50) = 4.98, p 
< ,001). Moreover. the 3 children who produced equivalence explanations in 
speech were found to produce equivalence explanations in gesture as well. These 
data provide further evidence for the hypothesis that equivalence appears in a 
child’s gestures before it appears in his speech (see Study 1). 
The Relationship between Gesture and Speech 
Overall. the children produced an average of 4.6 (out of 6) explanations contain- 
ing both gesture and speech, accounting for 77% of all explanations. Thirty-three 
percent of the 312 total explanations (44% of the 239 explanations with both 
gesture and speech) produced by all of the children were mismatched explana- 
tions. 
On the basis of the number of gesture/speech mismatches produced in their 
explanations, 20 of the 52 children were found to be discordant. and 32 were 
found to be concordant with respect to the concept of mathematical equivalence. 
The mean age for both the discordant and concordant children was 10;2. The 
discordant children produced an average of 3.95 mismatched explanations (SD = 
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1.09. range 3 to 6) and the concordant children produced an average of 0.81 
mismatched explanations (SD = .90, range 0 to 2). By design, none of the 
children. concordant or discordant, solved any of the six addition problems on 
the paper-and-pencil test correctly (i.e.. the 7 children who solved some of the 
problems correctly were eliminated from the study, allowing us to investigate 
children who displayed equal understanding of the mathematical problems). 
Discordance and Inconsistency 
Following our work on conservation (see Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986), we 
established two verbal measures of consistency of explanation-measures that 
were completely independent of our criteria for classifying concordant and dis- 
cordant children-in an attempt to determine whether the discordant children 
were more inconsistent than the concordant children when only verbal indices of 
consistency are considered. Thus, our indices were devised to rely on the chil- 
dren’s spoken responses. ignoring all information contained in gesture. 
Consistency between Problem Solutions and Their Explanations. We 
looked first at whether the strategy reflected in the solution to a given problem 
was consistent with the esplnnafiorz for that solution. For example, if a child 
gave the solution ‘28’ for the problem ‘4 + 6 + 9 = - + 9’ on the paper-and- 
pencil test, his explanation would be considered consistent with his solution if he 
said, “because 1 added the 4, the 6, and two 9’s” (i.e., the total sums to 28) and 
inconsistent if he said, “because I added 4 plus 6 plus 9” (i.e., the total sums to 
19). Note that it is possible for a child to be wrong and still consistent, or wrong 
and inconsistent. In this study. by design, all of the children’s solutions were 
incorrect; it was their consistency (and its relation to discordance) that was under 
investigation. Solution/explanation consistency was quantified in two ways: (I) 
using a by-response measure, that is, the number of consistent solutiomexplana- 
tion pairs produced by each child, and (2) using a by-child measure, that is. the 
number of children who produced at least 4 out of 6 consistent solution/explana- 
tion pairs. 
Consistency Across Explanations. Even if a child did not produce explana- 
tions consistent with his solutions, the child still might have produced explana- 
tions that expressed a consistent strategy across six problems. Consequently, a 
second index of consistency was devised, based on analyses of spoken explana- 
tions independent of their associated problem solutions. Two measures of this 
second index were calculated: (1) a by-response measure, that is, the maximum 
number of explanations expressing a single strategy (either add-all, add-to-equal 
sign, etc.) produced by each child, and (2) a by-child measure. that is, the 
number of children who produced at least 4 out of 6 explanations expressing a 
single strategy (e.g., 4/6 explanations expressing the add-all strategy, 4/6 ex- 
pressing the add-subtract strategy, etc.). 
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Table 10A. Consistency Between Problem Solutions 






Mean numhcr of con- 
sistcnr responses 
(UUI of 6) 
Proportion of children 
who had J/6 consis- 
tcnr rcs~mscs 
5.5 (SD = .76) 3.7 (SD = I..+)* 
.9J (N = 32) .43 (N = xl)+” 
Table IOB. Consistency Across Verbal Explanations 






Mean number of con- 
sistent responses 
(out of 6) 
Proportion of children 
who had J/6 consis- 
lent responses 
5.5 (SD = .SO) 3.3 (SD = I.h)* 
.94 (N = 37) .4x (N = 2oj** 
*p < ,001, using a I-test. comparing concordant and discordant 
children. 
**p < ,001. using a x2, comparing concordant and discordant 
children. 
Perfomrance of the concordant and discordant children was compared using 
these indices of consistency. Tables IOA and IOB present the data for the two 
consistency indices, each measured in terms of both the mean number of con- 
sistent explanations and the proportion of consistent children, for both concor- 
dant and discordant children. Concordant children achieved higher consistency 
scores than discordant children on both the by-child and by-response measures of 
the “consistency between problem solution and their explanations” index (Table 
IOA; [(SO) = 7.44, p < .OOl, for number of explanations; x’(1) = 22.32, p 
< .OOl. for number of children). In addition, concordant children achieved 
higher consistency scores than discordant children on both measures of the 
“consistency across verbal explanations” mdex (Table 10B; t(50) = 6.44, p < 
.OOl, for number of explanations; x’(1) = 18.66, p < ,001, for number of 
children). In fact, 21 of the 32 concordant children expressed only one type of 
strategy in their verbal explanations while only 2 of the 20 discordant children 
were this consistent (x’(1) = 13.27, p < .OOl); that is, most of the discordant 
children expressed at least two different strategies in their verbal explanations 
while most concordant children did not. 
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Since verbal inconsistency may be a characteristic of discordant children. it is 
reasonable to ask whether our two measures of verbal consistency can predict 
success after training as well as discordance can; that is, we ask whether these 
two verbal measures of consistency can also serve as indices of the transitional 
knowledge state. To address this issue, we turn to the data in our training study 
(Study I) and ask (a) whether verbal inconsistency is related to discordance in 
this second sample of children. and (b) whether verbal inconsistency is an impor- 
tant factor in predicting receptivity to instruction. 
Discordance versus Inconsistency as Predictors of 
Success after Training 
We first compared the performance of the concordant and discordant children in 
the training study (Study 1) using the two indices of verbal consistency described 
above. Table I I presents the data for the two consistency indices, each measured 
in terms of both the mean number of consistent explanations and the proportion 
of consistent children, for both concordant and discordant children. Although 
there is a tendency for concordant children to achieve higher consistency scores 
than discordant children. the differences are not significant, suggesting that 
verbal inconsistency does not reliably characterize the discordant child. 
Table 11A. Consistency between Problem Solutions 
and their Explanations for the Children in the Training 






Mean number of con- 
sistent responses 
(nut of 6) 
Proportion of children 
who had J/6 consis- 
tent responses 
4.9 (SD = 1.5) 4.7 (SD = 2.0) 
.83 (N = 34) .77 (N = 13) 
Table 11B. Consistency Across Verbal Explanations 
(independent of solutions) for the Children in the Training 






Mean number of con- 
sistent responses 
(out of 6) 
Proportion of children 
who had 4/6 consis- 
tent responses 
5.5 (SD = .71) 5.1 (SD = 1.4) 
1.00 (N = 24) .8S (N = 13) 
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To determine whether consistency is a factor in predicting success after in- 
struction, we calculated the proportion of children who succeeded on both the 
posttest and the generalization test after training as a function of each child’s 
discordance status and consistency status on the pretest. We calculated the pro- 
portions twice-once based on each child’s consistency between problem solu- 
tions and verbal explanations, and a second time in terms of the child’s con- 
sistency across the set of verbal explanations. For both indices. the by-child 
measure was used: For the first index. a child was considered consistent if hc 
produced four out of six verbal explanations that matched their associated prob- 
lem solutions, inconsistent if he failed to do so; for the second index, a child was 
considered consistent if he produced four out of six verbal explanations that 
conveyed the same strategy, inconsistent if he failed to do so. 
Table I2 presents the results for each of the two consistency indices. Al- 
though few, the inconsistent children performed like the consistent children in 
both the concordant and discordant groups. That is, inconsistent discordant chil- 
dren were as likely to improve after training as consistent discordant children, 
and both groups of discordant children (consistent and inconsistent) were more 
likely to improve than both groups of concordant children (consistent and 
inconsistent). 
Table 12. Proportion of Children Who 
Improved After Training as a Function 
of Discordance and Consistency Status 
on the Pretest 





Discordance Status on Pretest 
Concordant Discordant 
Consistent .?S (N = ZO),’ .60 (N = IO) 
Inconsislcnt .?S (N = 4) .67 (N = 3) 
Consistency Across Verbal Esplanations 
Consistency 
Status on Discordance Status on Pretest 
Pretest Concordant Discordant 
Consislcnt .2s (N = 1-4) .77 (N = II) 
lnconsistcnt - (N = 0) .so (N = 2) 
;‘Thc number in parentheses is the total number of 
children of each type (c.g., the total number of children 
who were both consistent and concordant on the prc- 
kst): the proportion rcprcsents the number of children 
out of that total who succeeded on both the posttcst and 
the generalization test. 
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In sum, although there was a tendency in one of our samples of subjects for 
discordant children to be inconsistent in the verbal explanations they produced to 
justify their solutions on the paper-and-pencil test, and inconsistent in the strat- 
egies they conveyed within their set of verbal explanations, this tendency failed 
to appear in our second sample, suggesting that verbal inconsistency does not 
reliably characterize the discordant child. Moreover, neither measure of verbal 
inconsistency appeared to play a role in predicting success after instruction. 
Thus, it appears to be inconsistency in the information conveyed in speech versus 
gesture-rather than inconsistency in the information conveyed in speech 
alone-that can be used to identify children who are in transition with respect to 
a particular concept. 
DISCUSSION 
Identifying Children in the Transitional Knowledge State 
Gesture has rarely been used as a tool for assessing the acquisition of concepts 
during development. This lack of focus on gesture may relate to the commonly 
held belief that gesture serves only as a precursor to speech, and that gesture 
wanes as speech waxes (see Jancovic, Devoe, & Weiner, 1975). McNeil1 (1986) 
and others (e.g.. Kendon, 1980; Slamu-Cazacu, 1976) have shown that this is 
not so. Gesture does not disappear as speech develops; rather, gesture increases 
in frequency and complexity along with speech during development (Jancovic et 
al.. 1975; McNeil], 1986) and, in fact, accompanies adult speech as frequently as 
child speech (McNeil], 1985). Moreover, McNeil1 (1986) has shown that the 
information conveyed in gesture ranges widely from the concrete (e.g., depicting 
events occurring in a cat-chases-bird cartoon) to the abstract (e.g., depicting 
mathematical infomlation about the calculus of limits). 
The present study provides further evidence that spontaneous gesture is not 
limited to a particular age group nor to a particular concept. Most of the 9- 
through 12-year-old children in our study were found to gesture spontaneously as 
they explained their responses on a test of mathematical equivalence. Moreover, 
as in our previous study of 5- to 8-year-olds explaining their responses on a 
conservation test (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986). many of the children in the 
studies reported here produced explanations in which the information conveyed 
in their spontaneous gestures failed to match the infomration conveyed in their 
speech. 
In addition, the results of these studies confiml gesture/speech mismatch as a 
marker of transitional knowledge. The mismatch (discordance) between the in- 
formation conveyed in gesture and the information conveyed in speech appears 
to index a child’s readiness to make use of instruction in either mathematical 
equivalence or conservation (see Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986). Thus. ges- 
ture/speech discordance has the potential to serve as a general technique for 
detemrining the times when a child is most receptive to the environmental input, 
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which stimulates change from one level of understanding of a concept to the 
next; that is. for determining when a child is in a transitional knowledge state 
with respect to a concept. 
Moreover, because children produce different types of gesture/speech mis- 
matches during these times of transition. it may be possible to use the informa- 
tion conveyed in mismatched responses to tailor instruction to a given child’s 
needs. The principle-based instruction we used during the ,training phase of 
Study I was quite minimal and was identical for all children--simply telling 
children that the goal was to make both sides of the equation equal. Perhaps a 
more extensive training procedure, one which capitalizes on the implicit knowl- 
edge the discordant child displays in his gestures, might be that much more 
effective in promoting learning in the discordant child. 
Characterizing the Transitional Knowledge State 
The transitional knowledge state has, at times. been characterized in ternis of a 
child’s level of knowledge of a concept. For example, the transitional child has 
been characterized as possessing a primordial version of the newly developing 
concept. and transitional knowledge has been described as a budding structure 
that is ready to bloom (Beii.;1, 1965; Brainerd, 1977; lnhelder & Sinclair, 1969: 
Vypotsky. 1978). A child who possesses this newly developing level of knowl- 
edge will presumably benefit from instruction because the child’s cognitive 
structure is sufficiently advanced to accommodate sophisticated input (see 
Beilin, 1965: Bminerd. 1972: Langer & Strauss, 1972; Murray, 1974; Strauss & 
Langer. 1970; Strauss & Rimalt. 1974). 
An alternative attribute that has also been used to characterize the transitional 
knowledge state is conflict (e.g., Halford, 1970; Piaget. 1967; Siegler, 1984; 
Wilkinson, 1982). For example, Wilkinson (1982). in his study of children’s 
strategies for solving problems of numerosity and density, found a subset of 
children who had at their disposal two incorrect algorithms which they in- 
terchanged unsystematically. As a second example, both Siegler (1984) and 
Piaget (1967) suggest that a subset of nonconservers will use the width dimen- 
sion to solve some liquid quantity conservation problems but the height dimen- 
sion to solve different liquid quantity problems. These strategies conflict in the 
sense that each leads to a different (incorrect) solution to the conservation prob- 
lem: A child who focuses on width is likely to conclude that the low, wide dish 
has more water: a child who focuses on height is likely to conclude that the tall, 
thin glass has more water. Thus, in these characterizations, the transitional 
knowledge state is one in which a child simultaneously holds two conflicting 
beliefs about the concept. Resolution of this conflict presumably results in a 
more advanced understanding of the concept (Ames & Murray, 1982; Murray, 
198 I, 1982; Riegel, 1975. 1976). 
Our data suggest that the transitional knowledge state can be characterized by 
both of these factors: level of knowledge (which is indexed by whether a child’s 
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predominant gesture-plus-speech explanation expresses the notion of equiv- 
alence or nonequivalence), and conflict or, in our terms, stability (which is 
indexed by whether gesture and speech match or mismatch). For example, the 
child who produces primarily discordant nonequivalent explanations (Type 2) 
differs from the child who produces concordant nonequivalent explanations 
(Type I), not in terms of the level of his knowledge (both children give rationales 
at the nonequivalent level), but rather in terms of the srabilit?, of that knowledge 
(the discordant child is more unstable than the concordant child, see Table 5). In 
contrast, the child who produces discordant nonequivalent explanations (Type 2) 
differs from the child who produces discordant mixed explanations (Type 3), not 
in terms of stability (both are discordant and therefore relatively unstable), but in 
terms of level (the child at the mixed level gives both nonequivalence and 
equivalence rationales; the child at the nonequivalent level gives only non- 
equivalence rationales). Thus, our data suggest that the transitional knowledge 
state is best characterized by taking into account both the level of a child’s 
knowledge and the stability of that knowledge. 
The Mechanism of Transition 
We have shown that gesture/speech discordance can serve as a useful technique 
for the experimenter (and perhaps for the teacher as well) to identify children in 
transition with respect to a particular concept. We consider now whether discor- 
dance has significance for the learner himself; that is, what role (if any) does 
gesture/speech mismatch play in the mechanism of cognitive change’? One pos- 
sibility is that gesture/speech mismatch simply serves as an index of transitional 
knowledge and has no role whatsoever in cognitive change. 
On the other hand, the production of mismatching gesture-plus-speech expla- 
nations may itself provide the impetus for change in the child’s acquisition of a 
concept. For example, if a child recognizes (either explicitly or implicitly) that 
the infomlation in his gestures conflicts with the information in the accompany- 
ing speech, that child may be compelled to reorganize his thinking to resolve the 
conflict. Note that our data suggest that the conflict (or inconsistency) which 
leads to change must appear within a single explanation rather than across a set of 
explanations (see Table 12). In other words, the conflicting pieces of information 
must be simulrarwouslv represented in order for transition to be facilitated. Thus, 
this first model presumes that conflict, as made explicit at a single moment 
through gesture-speech mismatch, is the impetus for transition to a higher knowl- 
edge state. 
A second mechanism by which gesture/speech mismatch might play a role in 
transition is as a “cognitive prop.” Externalizing his beliefs in two modalities- 
gesture as well as speech-may help the child pull back and evaluate those 
beliefs, resulting in reorganization of the beliefs into a single system (see Kar- 
miloff-Smith, 1985). Thus, it is neither the conflict, nor the gesture. per se, that 
leads to change; rather it is the fact that additional information is externalized 
390 Michelle Perry, R. Breckinridge Church, and Susan Coldin-Meadow 
(which presumably could occur in the form of written externalization as well as 
in the form of gesture) that is crucial for cognitive change. This second model 
presumes that a child who produces mismatches is not in a state of conflict but is 
in a state. where for the sake of efficiency, the numerous notions relating to a 
particular problem domain need to be consolidated. 
Finally, gesture/speech mismatch may be important for the mechanism of 
change not in terms of its direct effect on the learner, but indirectly in terms of its 
effect on the learning environment. The match or mismatch between gesture and 
speech may serve as a signal to the communication partner that he should adjust 
his instructions accordingly. We have found in pilot work that discordant chil- 
dren (who produce a large proportion of gesture/speech mismatches) elicit differ- 
ent types of training from a naive instructor (one who has lzof been told to attend 
to gesture and its relationship to speech) than do concordant children (who 
produce few gesture/speech mismatches). Thus, the child may play a role in 
shaping his own learning environment via his production (or lack of production) 
of gesture/speech mismatches. This third model presumes that the child’s display 
of instability-via his gesture-speech mismatches-alerts the environment (in- 
cluding teachers, parents, more advanced peers, etc.) to adjust input to the child 
in such a way that the child receives crucial infomlation for conceptual reorgani- 
zation. 
Characterizing the mental transition that occurs when new concepts are ac- 
quired and describing the mechanisms responsible for transitions of this sort are 
pivotal issues in both developmental and learning research. Our work suggests 
that the relationship between gesture and speech may prove to be a useful tool in 
characterizing the stability of knowledge states and in predicting the transitions 
between them. 
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